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Introduction
The North American Leaders Summit, held on June 29 2016 in Ottawa, 
brought together three telegenic heads of state: recently elected Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau of Canada, President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico, and 
President Barack Obama of the United States of America (USA). The “three 
amigos” offered a positive picture of integration and cooperation on issues 
ranging from energy and the environment to trade and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. The pleasant photo op belied a complicated reality for North 
America, however. Cooperation had stagnated for years as Trudeau’s prede-
cessor declined to schedule a summit in retaliation for Obama’s hesitation and 
ultimate rejection of a major oil pipeline. The US Congress and both major 
presidential candidates threatened to reject the TPP, while the Republican 
nominee promised to “break” the region’s fundamental trade accord and build 
a wall on the USA–Mexico border. Mexico struggled with the implementa-
tion of once-touted reforms, while concerns over security and governance 
continued. The moment highlighted the need for and possibilities of trilat-
eral cooperation, but also underlined the existential risks for North America’s 
future as a region.
Until the previous 25 years, “North America” has rarely been considered a 
region, and until then, it encompassed only the USA and Canada.1 Only in the 
early 1990s, when Mexico sought a free trade agreement with the USA, did a 
tri-national region begin to emerge. For most of the three countries’ histories, 
the shared continental geography was defined by the dominant presence of the 
USA and the potential or actual regional “bads” that emerged from it. During 
the 19th century, the USA threatened Canada’s and Mexico’s territorial integ-
rity and independence—a threat made real when the USA annexed half of 
Mexico’s territory in 1848 and followed with incursions into Mexico lasting 
into World War I. That threat dissipated in the following decades, but both 
Mexico and Canada adopted policies intended to keep their powerful neighbor 
at a distance by limiting investment, the presence of American companies, and 
the presence of US media.
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Despite those policies, geography helped propel the flow of trade and peo-
ple among the three countries. The ultimate goal of regional public goods 
(RPGs) is understood as promoting peace and prosperity. In North America, 
peace—at least at the interstate level—took shape even as policies aimed at 
regional prosperity received limited and sporadic attention. Cooperation grew 
more quickly between the USA and Canada, with 92 bilateral treaties signed 
between 1948 and 1965, compared to 38 between the USA and Mexico.2 
The year 1965 was an early watershed: the Canada–United States Automotive 
Products Agreement represented an early step in the production of RPGs 
aimed at enhancing regional prosperity. Regionalism took a quantum leap for-
ward in 1988, with the negotiation of an FTA between the USA and Canada. 
Canada sought the agreement as a way to emerge from economic stagnation, 
and the agreement’s model for RPGs relied heavily on an open US market. The 
agreement broke ground by including nontariff barriers, trade in services, and 
dispute resolution. RPG production centered on increased trade and invest-
ment; however, it indirectly deepened US–Canadian cooperation in a number 
of spheres. Clearer dispute resolution procedures helped produce greater rule 
of law at the bilateral level, which would become even more important in the 
ensuing trilateral accord.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formally expanded 
the region to Mexico—catching up with economic and social trends—and 
enhanced the demand for and potential of RPGs. NAFTA was founded on 
the premise that important RPGs would be generated by the closer economic 
integration of the three countries. In particular, it was assumed that the virtual 
disappearance of trade barriers in North America would increase trade in a 
spectacular form—which it did—and that higher volumes of trade would result 
in faster rates of economic growth, particularly for Mexico, the smallest of the 
three economies. Unfortunately, this latter assumption did not hold true, since 
the average rate of growth of the Mexican economy has remained disappoint-
ingly low since NAFTA came into effect in 1994.
NAFTA represented a different approach to regionalism, though with simi-
larities to the types that Amitav Acharya discusses in Chapter 3 of this volume. 
As a region defined by asymmetry and economically dependent on the huge 
US market, it has aspects of hegemonic regionalism. However, North America 
was brought into being by Canadian and Mexican initiatives, and the US gov-
ernment has rarely dedicated great attention to the region. In its economic 
aspects and its legalism, NAFTA represented an integrationist effort. However, 
it has not followed the European model of building regional bureaucracies, 
nor ASEAN’s model of frequent consultation and engagement with external 
powers. There has been relatively limited spillover in the neofunctionalist sense 
of growing demands for cooperation and institutionalization across issue areas. 
Through NAFTA, the three countries took steps away from protectionism and 
nationalist policies, but at a governmental level have shown little initiative to 
go beyond that. Some of these relative gains have been reversed since 2001, 
after which stagnation has become the rule. North America has prized the 
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national over the supranational, and in almost all cases, Canada, Mexico, and 
the USA engage with the rest of the world as individual states, not as a region. 
Despite these differences, we argue that North America should be treated as 
a region. Geography provides an obvious rationale; more important are the 
myriad connections among the three countries, which range from production 
chains to family networks. Using an RPG framework, we describe goods that 
have been created in the region and areas in which those goods are lacking.
With the important exceptions of trade and investment, many of the RPGs 
forecasted to be the major accomplishments of the new trading bloc did not 
materialize, particularly rapid and sustained economic growth in Mexico. 
Other RPGs that were not so obvious at the launching of NAFTA, like 
enhancing the rule of law in Mexico and at the regional level, with posi-
tive effects for foreign investment throughout the region, were more salient. 
While enhanced rule of law has benefited actors at the regional levels of the 
economies, NAFTA did not—and probably could not—create rule of law 
that would spill over to the economies as a whole. As such, important sectoral 
and geographic disparities in goods provision remain. As a recent McKinsey 
Global Institute study by Bolio et al. (2014) demonstrates, while productivity 
of the “modern” sector of the Mexican economy with close ties to NAFTA 
grew at a compounded annual rate of 5.8% per year between 1999 and 2009, 
the productivity of the “traditional” firms that cater to the domestic market, 
including those in the informal economy, has fallen at an annual compounded 
rate of 6.5%. RPGs only partially compensate for weak goods production at 
the national and local levels.
This paper will briefly examine the concept of RPGs as it applies to North 
America. Focusing on the role of these goods, it contextualizes today’s situa-
tion with a succinct account of North American integration. The paper argues 
that rule of law has emerged as one of the most important RPGs in North 
America, directed largely at regional economic transactions. While these effects 
have been important, the provision of rule of law is fragmentary and has not 
produced the degree of spillover that was hoped for. Finally, we conclude by 
examining the future prospects of RPG provision in North America.
Overview of the region before regional integration 
agreements
Before 1988, US–Canadian economic cooperation was guided by the mul-
tilateral trade framework that the USA had promoted after World War II 
with the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 
Both states were founding GATT members, unlike Mexico, which joined 
nearly four decades later. Until the negotiation of the US–Canadian FTA 
(CUSFTA), the USA showed a strong preference for global, multilateral 
economic RPGs. However, there were more limited earlier agreements, 
which can be seen as RPG inputs, produced in other areas. Between 1948 
and 1992, when NAFTA negotiations began in earnest, Canada, the USA, 
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and Mexico had signed 451 treaties between them, with more than 100 
for each category of connectivity, peace and security, and natural resources 
and the environment (see Figure 13.1).3 Besides eliminating barriers to trade 
and investment, the basic purpose of CUSFTA, especially in the eyes of the 
Canadians, was to establish a dispute settlement system that eliminated high-
handed unilateral actions from the USA.
While remaining outside the GATT, Mexico pursued an inward-looking, 
protectionist policy of import substitution, based on the ideas promoted by 
Raúl Prebisch and the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) that nations needed to industrialize to 
escape their “secularly deteriorating terms of trade” as commodity exporters. 
Mexico pursued a number of integration agreements with Latin America, such 
as LAFTA (1960) and SELA (1975), but none led to substantial economic 
integration or produced important RPGs. These failures contrast with the suc-
cess, albeit limited to trade and investment, of NAFTA. The former were 
politically propelled and maintained protectionism, while NAFTA involved an 
open trade agenda, with few exceptions, that traded economic nationalism for 
an integrated trade and investment area.
Starting in 1988, Mexico’s newly elected president Carlos Salinas sought 
to anchor recent market-friendly reforms through trade deals. Before turn-
ing to the north, Salinas had sought closer economic ties with Europe and 
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Figure 13.1 Total Treaties in North America.
Source: Liu and Kahn, Regional Public Goods Database (Chapter 2).
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Japan, only to be rejected by both. President George Bush, however, quickly 
accepted Salinas’ request for a bilateral pact. The presidents-elect established a 
good personal rapport, dubbed the “spirit of Houston,” after a meeting in the 
Texan city a few weeks before their respective inaugurations. In August 1990, 
President Bush indicated to Congress that he intended to move forward with 
a bilateral agreement, at which point Canada reversed its earlier reticence and 
asked to join (Boskin 2014). Thus began the three-nation North American 
economic region.
The pursuit of NAFTA
Although the Mexican government faced internal skepticism about free trade 
with the USA, Mexicans did not expect any serious opposition to the trade 
talks. However, US labor unions, human rights NGOs, environmental groups, 
populist politicians like businessman Ross Perot, the Congressional Black 
Caucus, and the right wing of the Republican Party opposed granting Bush 
fast-track authority to negotiate with Mexico. It became clear that the Mexican 
government had to engage in Congressional politics to overcome objections 
from opponents of free trade with Mexico—though few had expressed reser-
vations about the earlier Canadian accord or ongoing GATT round.4
Once the fast-track vote was won and formal talks began, the negotiation 
proceeded at a rapid pace, though not fast enough to get NAFTA through 
Congress before the presidential election of 1992. When Bill Clinton unseated 
Bush, with help from anti-NAFTA crusader Ross Perot, who won 18.9% 
of the vote, it opened a new phase in the formally completed negotiations. 
Responding to trade unions and environmental activists, Clinton insisted that 
NAFTA would include side agreements on these areas. These were final-
ized in September 1993, and the whole bill was sent to Congress. The House 
approved NAFTA by a slim margin of 34 votes on November 17; the Senate 
passed NAFTA three days later with 61 votes in favor and 38 against. NAFTA 
took effect on January 1 1994 (see Long 2015, chapter 4).
As stated in the agreement’s objectives, the most important RPGs expected 
from NAFTA were in the following areas:
 • The elimination of trade barriers and the facilitation of “the cross-border 
movement of goods and services” between the three nations.
 • The promotion of “fair competition.”
 • Regional investment.
 • Protection of intellectual property rights.
 • Institutionalization of the agreement’s implementation and administration, 
with mechanisms for dispute resolution (NAFTA Secretariat 1993).
Fulfilling these obligations in North America demanded a major transforma-
tion of the institutional and legal landscape, particularly for Mexico, whose 
standards had to catch up with those of the other two countries. Success was 
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not evenly achieved, but trade and investment grew quickly in NAFTA’s first 
decade (see Figure 13.2). The dispute resolution system created by the agree-
ment has worked remarkably well.
The first RPG that surfaced unexpectedly in the region was the result of the 
currency crisis that hit Mexico in December 1994, when unprecedented politi-
cal violence caused jitters in the financial markets. A combination of these fears, 
plus the ensuing issuing of large amounts of US-dollar–denominated short-
term debt, an insufficiently flexible exchange rate system, and the inexpert 
management of the situation by a rookie administration, led to a devaluation 
in which the Mexican peso lost two-thirds of its value against the US dollar, 
causing panic in the financial and foreign exchange markets. The risk that this 
situation would get out of control less than a year after NAFTA came into 
force drove President Clinton to skirt Congress and prepare an unprecedented 
US$50 billion rescue package based on the Exchange Stabilization Fund and 
resources from the IMF, the World Bank, Canada, the European Union (EU), 
and Japan. The crisis rapidly dissipated and, after a deep recession, Mexico 
began to grow again within six quarters and repaid all its debt in 1997, well 
ahead of schedule. It is doubtful whether the USA would have undertaken this 
rescue operation had it not been for NAFTA.
Bolstered by RPGs in trade, rule of law, and macroeconomic stability, 
the creation of NAFTA achieved remarkable success in its first seven years. 
Between 1994 and 2001, its share of the global GDP went from 30% to 36%, 
as all other regions of the world lost ground. The EU fell by 1 percentage 
point, to 25%, despite having increased its membership; Asia5 went from 25% 
Figure 13.2 US Trade with North America (billions of US$).
Source: Pastor (2011, p.25).
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to 22%; while the rest of the world lost 2 percentage points to reach just 17% 
of the total in 2001. In this period North America emerged as a formidable 
region that exceeded the EU in terms of economic size and productivity. The 
three economies and societies were progressively connected by trade, invest-
ment, pipelines, tourism, and immigration (see Figure 13.3). In early 2001, 
the presidents of Mexico and the USA proposed a North American economic 
community. In April they traveled to Canada to consult with its prime min-
ister: “It seemed like the high point of North American integration, and as it 
turned out, it was” (Pastor 2011, p.23).
By the end of 2001, the North American landscape had dramatically 
changed. The continental economy slowed with the end of the dot-com boom 
in the USA. The downturn was amplified by the terrorist attacks of September 
11 2001. Instead of responding regionally, the USA tightened its own borders, 
which slowed trade during a recession. The attacks led to a surge in nationalist, 
frequently nativist, sentiments that undermined efforts to find regional solu-
tions regarding security—such as the Security and Prosperity Partnership—or 
migration. Perversely, as the need grew to better manage massive transna-
tional flows, improve security, and enhance rule of law, the willingness of the 
three governments and their publics to produce them faded. The results of 
these failures are not encouraging. It is estimated that the region’s share of the 
world’s GDP in 2015 is between 25% and 27%, depending on the level of the 
exchange rates of their three currencies, a serious drop from the 36% reached 
in 2001. The three governments have largely failed to use NAFTA as a plat-
form on which to build a more competitive region and address a new agenda 
beyond that of the trade agreement’s mandate.
Figure 13.3  Integration: Intra-North American Trade as Percentage of North 
American Trade with the World.
Source: Pastor (2011, p.27).
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RPGs in North America
Since NAFTA, transnational flows of nearly every variety have grown 
dramatically; however, the response has not always been regional in nature. 
North America’s founding document is firmly situated in national principles—
NAFTA’s negotiators avoided hints of supranationalism. NAFTA’s founding 
document makes it clear that none of the parties sought an expansive regionalism 
(Long 2014; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Since the mid-2000s, trilateralism has 
frequently been replaced by dual-bilateralism. In a sense, this is a return to an 
historical pattern in North America. According to UN registries, there is only 
one trilateral treaty in North America—a 1976 environmental treaty. (NAFTA is 
not a treaty, so it is not included, signaling limitations with the data.) Mexico and 
Canada have only reported six bilateral treaties since 1948. However, the USA 
has 281 treaties with Canada and 216 with Mexico (see Figure 13.4).6
Despite NAFTA’s national nature, it has led to the creation of important 
RPGs. We define RPGs in North America as a type of public good that 
“provides nonexclusive and nonrival benefits to individuals in a well-defined 
region” (this builds on Sandler 2004; Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Nguyen 2004; 
and Chapter 1 of this volume). Estevadeordal et  al. (2004) note that RPGs 
are often an outcome of regional cooperation agreements, of which NAFTA 
was an early and widely copied example. The dramatic increases in trade and 
Figure 13.4 US Bilateral Treaties by Partner.
Source: Liu and Kahn, Regional Public Goods Database (Chapter 2).
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investment that came with NAFTA were accompanied by much larger flows 
of migration and illicit traffic, all of which affected the demand for and provi-
sion of RPGs.
In the North American context, it is particularly important to highlight 
the interplay across different levels of government as this is relevant to the 
demand for and production of RPGs. Domestic, not regional, problems 
have been a greater factor in Mexico’s disappointing economic growth over 
the past two decades. RPGs are unlikely to be a panacea for problems of 
peace and prosperity. A more adequate approach should start with the ques-
tion of complementarity: where can RPGs make positive contributions? 
(See Chapter 6.) As RPGs cannot resolve many fundamentally domestic 
issues, weak provision of public goods at the national level can lower levels 
of regional goods.
Sandler (2006, p.10) offers a framework for examining the “aggregation 
technology” for RPGs—in essence, how the nature of RPG provision varies 
depending on the type of impure public good. Two of the types of aggregation 
Sandler discusses are particularly relevant. Sandler describes “weighted sum” 
aggregation of RPGs—“provision is no longer perfectly substitutable among 
countries” (Sandler 2004, p.18). The creation and benefits of the RPG are not 
equally shared. Second, Sandler discusses “weaker link” public goods, which 
are diminished by the unequal creation of that good across the region. With 
weaker link goods, the lowest level of provision has the greatest impact on the 
overall level of the RPG. Sandler’s framework provides a way to conceptualize 
the provision of rule of law as an RPG that is not uniform across geographies 
or levels of analysis.
Sandler’s analysis remains regional; however, RPGs have local and national 
effects. Similarly, deficient governance at the local and national level may 
reduce the availability of goods across the region. In this case, the weaker link 
in the production of rule of law in many sectors occurs in Mexico, largely due 
to lower state capacity. Insufficient provision by Mexico affects the total ben-
efits of the RPG available to people and businesses across the region, but harms 
Mexico most of all. This is clear in terms of transnational security, particularly 
in the criminal justice system: Mexico suffers most—in social and economic 
terms—from the weakness of rule of law. The deficit affects the entirety of 
North America (and Central America, too) with decreasing intensity as it radi-
ates outwards. While additional contributions from other states in the region 
to this weaker link RPG may produce benefits, the effects will be unequally 
distributed.
Rule of law as a regional public good
Though rule of law has often been treated as a public good at the local and 
national levels, this has rarely been the case regionally. In this section, we 
examine the concept of rule of law as a weaker link good with partial over-
lap and limited spillover across local, national, and regional levels. Like the 
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related concept of governance, rule of law displays certain similarities across 
levels of analysis:7 1) public and transparent rules, 2) equivalent application 
of these rules, and 3) open and public decision-making procedures. At the 
national level, where rule of law has been most studied, Guillermo O’Donnell 
(2004) defined it as existing when “whatever law exists is written down and 
publicly promulgated by an appropriate authority before the events meant to 
be regulated by it, and is fairly applied by relevant state institutions includ-
ing the judiciary . . . the administrative application or judicial adjudication of 
legal rules is consistent across equivalent cases; is made without taking into 
consideration the class, status, or relative amounts of power held by the par-
ties in such cases; and applies procedures that are pre-established, knowable, 
and allow a fair chance for the views and interests at stake in each case to be 
properly voiced.”
There are at least three reasons to consider regional rule of law in North 
America. Rule of law provides social order. There is a long tradition in 
International Relations of considering “international society” (Bull 1977, 1984, 
and Hurrell 2007), and the stronger web of connections makes the regional 
level even more “social.” NAFTA also spurred more frequent and institu-
tionalized interactions of officials among the three countries (Aspinwall 2009). 
NAFTA created clearer rules to structure transactions between and among 
member states, providing clarity at the regional level for trade and investment. 
Second, NAFTA created procedures that resolve some of the disputes that can 
arise from these transactions (completing equivalent application and openness 
as part of rule of law). Institutionalized dispute resolution replaces the threat of 
arbitrary US protectionism with regional rule of law, through which all three 
countries benefit. Finally, regional rule of law has enhanced, albeit imperfectly, 
the rule of law at the domestic level. In transnational cases, business disputes 
can be settled in the courts of the country of the claimant’s choosing. Through 
this, Mexico “borrowed” the US judiciary and rule of law for some issues, 
thereby bringing a regional dimension even to domestic rule of law in the 
three countries.
NAFTA sought to promote a partial spillover from the regional level to the 
Mexican domestic context. While RPGs may partially overcome deficits at the 
national and local levels, this spillover exists unevenly across geographies and 
issue areas. Deficits at local and national levels also undermine regional rule of 
law. Like many goods, the demand, production, and consumption of rule of 
law are not evenly distributed across the North American region. Nor has this 
good been evenly distributed among social and economic sectors.
The rule of law as a regional public good: the case of 
Mexico
North America’s prospects could be improved by enhancing the production 
of RPGs, such as rule of law. Among the countries of North America, it 
remains clear that Mexico has the least reliable legal system and weakest rule 
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of law. While NAFTA contributed to an improvement in rule of law for 
some sections of the economy, for much of the population the situation has 
become worse. The share of employment in the “modern” sector, defined 
by size as firms employing 500 workers or more, has remained constant in 
the period mentioned at 20% of the labor force; the share of the “traditional” 
firms, with 10 employees or less, has grown from 39% to 42%; while the 
segment in between these, firms with 11 to 500 employees, which could 
be characterized as the bridge connecting the two, has seen its share fall. 
The falling productivity of the traditional part of the economy has resulted 
in wages for low-skilled workers that fell between 1999 and 2009 by 2.4% 
per year, while the salaries of the workers in the “modern” segment have 
remained stagnant despite the impressive gains in productivity (Bolio et al. 
2014). Stagnant or falling wages are not what was expected from North 
America economic integration. The deepening split between modern and 
traditional also has a geographic dimension, since the former are located in 
the north and center of the country, closer to the US border and with much 
better physical and social infrastructure, while the latter are concentrated in 
the south. In this sense, NAFTA resulted in deepening the division of the 
country into two segments: one that prospers and grows, and another which 
remains impoverished.
Mexico’s market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, as profound 
as they appeared to be, did not alter longstanding institutional weaknesses. 
The reforms were full of contradictions. Despite their liberalizing logic, some 
sectors remained protected from international competition. Privatizations 
did not adequately consider the transformation and better integration of the 
economy’s structure. Many regulations were eliminated, but others con-
tinued to stifle innovation, and subsidies did not disappear. In the face of 
entrenched interests and political opposition, Mexico’s reform process largely 
stagnated. When the PRI returned to power in 2012, President Peña Nieto 
(whose term in office is due to expire in 2018) forged a political coalition 
behind a “Pact for Mexico,” to advance energy, fiscal, telecommunications, 
education, and other reforms (Sada 2013). The energy reform welcomed 
private and foreign investment to the oil and gas business in Mexico for 
the first time in almost 80 years and increased competition in the electri-
cal sector. This reduced the dominance of state-owned monopolies Petróleos 
Mexicanos and the Federal Electricity Commission in those key sectors. The 
reforms follow NAFTA’s logic of bringing strategic areas under the cover of 
the US legal system to assure foreign and domestic investors. It is too early to 
assess the reforms’ political sustainability and economic effects; some reforms, 
including energy and education, have drawn determined opposition as the 
president’s approval ratings have deteriorated. However, the opening of key 
sectors excluded from NAFTA may provide momentum for closer regional 
integration, especially in energy.
Though much of its production has come via externalities or has been ad hoc, 
North America has some multilateral institutions that contribute to regional 
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rule of law. First, NAFTA created panels for trade dispute resolution. Second, 
NAFTA created clearer rules for investment and institutionalized mechanisms 
for the settlement of disputes between investors and the states-party. These new 
mechanisms expanded the rule of law, primarily for international businesses 
and investors, though also to Mexican firms associated with foreign inves-
tors in complex supply chains. The agreements help to keep politics at arms’ 
length in state–investor disagreements (Brower 2015). Third, NAFTA created 
some (weak) mechanisms, through which citizens and civil society groups can 
appeal at the international level in pursuit of compliance with national law 
and NAFTA obligations. These mechanisms enhanced the clarity of regional 
transactions, serving as a “club good” for economic actors within the three 
countries, promoting intra-North American investment. However, regionally 
produced rule of law primarily benefits only the sectors of those societies that 
are engaged in licit international transactions. It does not provide the same 
benefits to regions with low participation in international transactions, nor 
does it address the worrying trade in illicit goods among the three countries, 
mostly between Mexico and the United States. These are, mainly, illegal drugs 
and illegally trafficked people from the south flowing north and weapons and 
money from the north flowing south. The overall economic magnitude of 
illicit trade is unknown, for obvious reasons, but official estimates place the 
USA–Mexico drug trade at about 5% of the amount of legal bilateral trade in 
goods and services, which will approach US$600 billion in 2016.8 Although 
law enforcement officials of both countries believe that the enormous growth 
in legal trade can help mask the illicit flows, particularly facilitating cash trans-
fers and money laundering, trade experts have pointed to closer, more effective 
cooperation between the United States and Mexico, engendered by legal trade 
flows. More to the point, the expansion of this illicit trade, and the violence 
and corruption surrounding it, weakens the benefits of rule of law as a regional 
public good.
Dispute resolution mechanisms were important for all the actors involved, 
though in different ways. Mexico and Canada worried primarily about 
whether the USA—particularly a protectionist Congress—could under-
mine their gains in market access through unilateral measures, as we saw 
when President Obama adopted “buy American” provisions at the start of 
the Great Recession that are illegal under NAFTA. At the time, the USA 
and Canada sought investment protections and dispute resolution because of 
concerns about the political climate and weak judicial system in Mexico, and 
US investors worried about the risk of expropriation in Mexico and protec-
tion of intellectual property. These concerns were crystallized in two separate 
parts of the agreement, Chapters 11 and 19.
NAFTA’s chapter 11 sought to regionalize and rationalize disputes between 
states and investors. For decades, when companies had grievances about their 
investments in other countries, they sought the protection of their home gov-
ernment, hoping to gain diplomatic pressure on their behalf. This took the 
dispute out of the legal and economic realms and placed it squarely in the 
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political. Transparency and predictability suffered. Handling grievances under 
national courts—a principle long advanced in Latin America dating back to 
the Drago and Calvo doctrines—offered little assurance to investors if these 
courts were viewed as subject to political influence or as biased toward national 
actors. Put differently, chapter 11 was intended to bring the rule of law to 
these disputes, understood as the fair and consistent application of transparent, 
public, pre-existing rules. As Brower (2015) wrote: “a rule-based system must 
have an enforcement mechanism if its substantive rules are to have any meaning 
over the long term.”
The evolving nature of investor–state disputes demonstrates that rule of 
law concerns were not limited strictly to Mexico. In recent cases, Canadian 
provincial and local regulations have been seen as injuring foreign inves-
tors, drawing criticism from Canadian activists (Sinclair 2015). Through the 
end of 2014, there had been 77 investor–state disputes under chapter 11. 
Canada has been the subject of the greatest number of claims (35), though 
Mexico has paid a larger share of judgments (US$204 million). While there 
are debates about whether these rulings have infringed on governments’ 
legitimate regulatory powers, the existence of a clear framework seems to 
have favored investment. In Mexico, where there was the greatest initial 
concern about transparent dispute settlement, nearly 60% of total inward 
FDI has originated from NAFTA partner countries, according to data from 
UNCTAD. This happened even as total inward FDI in Mexico increased 
more than 17 times from 1990 to 2013. Canada’s increase has been nearly as 
dramatic (see Figure 13.5).
Figure 13.5 Inward FDI Stock, 1980–2013.
Source: Compiled by authors based on UNCTADstat, Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and 
Outward Flows and Stock Databse, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
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The limits of regional rule of law
The ability to resolve disputes pacifically at the regional level has not created 
spillover in terms of Mexico’s ability to resolve disputes among its citizens 
with regularity and transparency. Mexico performs very poorly for various 
indicators related to rule of law and impunity. The country lacks the appro-
priate judicial infrastructure and rates of prosecution for crime are extremely 
low. A recent study on impunity noted that Mexico has just four judges for 
every 100,000 residents—less than a quarter of the average for the 59 countries 
involved in the study and half the rates for the USA (9.8) and Canada (8.4).9 
As the country has turned to the military to battle drug trafficking, extraju-
dicial punishment seems to be a growing problem and human rights abuses 
have become a source of serious concern. Similarly, a number of recent tragic 
incidents have revealed the depth of cartels’ and gangs’ penetration into local 
political systems, irrespective of which political party is in charge. The impact 
of these struggles goes beyond the local level.
According to the World Bank’s estimates, rule of law in Mexico improved 
significantly around 2000, as the government transitioned for the first time 
to the opposition center-right National Action Party (PAN). This estimate 
declined as drug-related violence increased from 2006–2007 under the stew-
ardship of a second PAN administration. Within this composite indicator, 
Mexico’s scores on government effectiveness and regulatory quality have seen 
moderate increases, although they are offset by indicators related to violence 
(see Figure 13.6). These figures appear to blend two divergent trends in the 
Mexican economy.
Figure 13.6 Rule of Law in Mexico.
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank DataBank.
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Challenges with rule of law, whether national or regional, are not limited 
to Mexico. This is clearly visible in the dysfunctional US immigration system, 
where high levels of undocumented immigration create public “bads” with 
impacts across levels of governance, including for shaping more effective tax, 
social service, and labor market policies. As with many such issues, the need 
for RPGs in rule of law is directly linked to the expansion of transnational 
flows. While NAFTA created a regional market for goods, and to a lesser but 
important extent for services and capital, it did not legally unify labor markets.
As Estevadeordal et  al. (2004, p.6) note, national commitments are cru-
cial for adequate RPG creation. “If states are unwilling to envisage a role 
for regional cooperation to promote national development, it is unlikely that 
RPGs will be supplied at optimal levels.” When one observes the current 
political scenario of North America, it is difficult to avoid skepticism about 
the likelihood of a more united North America. There is neither the interest 
nor the necessary attention on the part of the governments in question, with 
the possible exception of Mexico, which is immersed in a deep process of eco-
nomic reforms and whose government is mired in a delicate political situation 
with very low approval from the population, which distract it from regional 
integration. While Trudeau favors multilateralism more than his predecessor, 
the emphasis on bilateral USA–Canada ties remains. For their part, US politi-
cians have more often referred to NAFTA as a scapegoat, not as a framework 
for regional responses to shared problems.
Central RPGs: past production and future prospects
In Chapter 2, Liu and Kahn divide RPGs into six functional categories. While 
we have focused on the rule of law, in closing we will address other RPGs 
produced—or lacking—in each of these functional categories.
Economic cooperation and integration
NAFTA’s focus was on the production of RPGs in trade and investment. At 
the regional level, these RPGs have produced greater prosperity, though with 
unequal distribution. However, trade and investment have not been the only 
economic RPGs in North America. At the macro level, there has been signifi-
cant convergence among the three economies in terms of business cycles and 
interest rates, leading to a more predictable environment for companies that 
produce, invest, and trade in North America (Serra Puche 2015). NAFTA did 
not include formal agreements to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies, but 
informally communication among the treasuries and the central banks of the 
region is important. While for the most part convergence has been an external-
ity of closer links among the three economies, it has at times been intentionally 
supported by government actions—most crucially in the significant US back-
ing of Mexico during its 1994 peso crisis (De Long, De Long, and Robinson 
1996; Edwards 1998).
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Transnational production chains have been a significant, only partially 
anticipated aspect of NAFTA. About 40% of the value added in Mexican 
exports to the USA was produced in the USA (Wilson 2011). Mexican firms 
have benefited from their insertion into the regional economy, growing 
more competitive and productive through the adoption of modern busi-
ness practices. However, the regional economy contributes to a bifurcation 
between the regionally and globally active and the purely domestic. Talent 
and capital are available to the former while being drawn away from the 
latter. In Mexico, this has been reflected in the growth of employment in 
the informal economy (60% of the workforce, by some measures, but just 
a quarter of the GDP) (Flores 2014) where productivity has declined. By 
definition, this huge informal sector is an area where the rule of law is largely 
absent and the provision of RPGs has very little effect. RPGs cannot entirely 
substitute the need to produce similar public goods at the national and sub-
national levels.
Human and social development
Despite their proximity, educational exchanges in the region have been lack-
ing. The number of students who study abroad in another North American 
country trails behind the numbers of those who head farther afield. Canada 
and Mexico combined to send about 72,000 students to the USA—fewer than 
Saudi Arabia, and far fewer than Asia, which sent a whopping 839,000.10 As 
Robert Pastor frequently pointed out, there are hundreds of academic research 
centers in North America dedicated to other areas of the world, but few that 
focus on North America.11 Support for greater educational exchanges among 
the three countries would create important RPGs. The leaders have recog-
nized this need, pledging in 2016 to create the North American Center for 
Collaborative Development, based at the University of Arizona’s Consortium 
for North American Higher Education Collaboration. Its promotion of 
research on shared challenges is sorely needed, though the commitment of 
funds and leadership is not yet clear. Summit pledges also included greater edu-
cational exchanges and programs to boost indigenous education and women’s 
entrepreneurship (White House 2016).
RPG production has been more effective in certain professional areas, such 
as epidemiology. Governmental, academic, and private-sector actors in the 
health field undertake extensive planning and preparation to contain pos-
sible outbreaks of disease. There is close communication and collaboration 
among the three countries, thus mitigating one possible negative externality 
of increased regional flows. A 2007 plan created under the defunct Security 
and Prosperity Partnership helped guide the three countries’ responses to a 
2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza. The plan has been augmented with lessons 
learned12 and to address emerging diseases including Zika and chikungunya 
(White House 2016).
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Natural resources, environment, and energy
North America has been defined by the extensive borders between the USA 
and its neighbors in terms of both the threats and opportunities that these entail. 
This is particularly clear regarding environmental challenges and opportuni-
ties for energy sector cooperation. Long before NAFTA, regional agreements 
sought to manage shared border resources and to limit transnational pollution.
Some of the stronger intergovernmental organizations to emerge from 
NAFTA concern environmental issues, where the challenges are very clearly 
transnational and sovereignty concerns have been less pronounced. Two 
merit mention: the North American Development Bank (Nadbank) and the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The Nadbank has lim-
ited funding and a restricted mandate, but it has financed nearly 200 projects 
that address environmental and health issues on the USA–Mexico border. 
Though the CEC lacks sharp teeth—deliberately so according to the terms of 
NAFTA’s environmental side agreement—it has provided a venue for appeals 
from civil society to the international level. NGOs can use the CEC to chal-
lenge national governments over the perceived failure to implement national 
environmental legislation. Though it lacks the power to sanction, the CEC’s 
reports have served as a means to pressure governments into compliance.
In recent summits, North American leaders have forged a commitment 
to build upon Mexican energy reforms and the growth of energy produc-
tion in the USA and Canada to create a more secure, integrated, and green 
North American energy market (White House 2015, 2016). Perhaps the big-
gest headlines from the 2016 Ottawa summit involved increasing clean energy 
production, boosting efficiency standards, and working to implement the Paris 
climate accords. While Mexico has sought to lead on the issue in its diplomacy 
and radical pledges to reduce CO
2
 emissions, and Canada’s new leadership 
has made bolder commitments on climate, the ability of the United States to 
deliver is complicated by sharp partisan divisions.
At a meeting of energy ministers in December 2014, the three countries 
sought to develop a regional comparative advantage in energy. This focused 
on “three strategic areas”: joint statistics and mapping of energy resources 
and infrastructure; unconventional oil and gas; and modernization of energy 
infrastructure, institutions, and innovation (Natural Resources Canada 2014). 
Given the widespread impact of energy on both the economy and the environ-
ment, this should remain an important area for RPGs.
Peace and security
At the level of traditional interstate security, North America resembles Karl 
Deutsch’s concept of a security community. There are no serious preparations 
for interstate conflict and there is an expectation that disagreements will be set-
tled without resorting to threats of, or the use of, force (Deutsch 1957), with 
the possible exception of the Republican nominee for president being elected 
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in November 2016. However, the existence of a high-level security commu-
nity has not lessened the impact of transnational and human security concerns, 
which have become even more salient in recent years. Both the importance 
and limitations of RPG rule of law can be seen in transnational security, a key 
challenge for Mexico, in which the USA is particularly involved as the largest 
market for drugs and a provider of illicit arms and official security support.
There has been significant regional cooperation is terms of transnational 
security. However, these problems make clear that the limits of spillover vary 
from one level of governance to another. US efforts to control drug trafficking 
in Mexico in cooperation with the Mexican government have had no dis-
cernible effect on the level of traffic. Policy coordination has been effective in 
some regards, such as intelligence cooperation aimed at capturing cartel lead-
ers. However, it has been noticeably absent in others, such as in the control of 
southbound arms shipments.
The strategy of aggressive policing has produced, at least in the short term, 
greater human insecurity—and tremendous human and economic costs—without 
notable improvements to the rule of law (Kenny, Serrano, and Sotomayor 2012). 
According to official government statistics, impunity has actually worsened: nearly 
94% of crimes are not reported or investigated. This figure was nearly as high for 
crimes against businesses, of which 88% were not reported or investigated. While 
Mexico has more police per capita than the international average,13 just 22% of 
Mexicans have some or much confidence in the police, according to a December 
2014 poll by the newspaper Reforma (Grupo Reforma 2014). Nearly half of pris-
oners are being detained without having been sentenced.
Insecurity is the most blatant manifestation of inadequate rule of law. About 
one-third of surveyed Mexican households reported having at least one person 
who was a victim of a crime in 2014; only a fraction are officially reported. 
Security concerns have a tremendous impact on Mexican businesses, too, 
which face a national average cost of more than MXN55,700 (equivalent 
to an average US$3,840 in 2015) annually as a result of crime and security 
measures (INEGI 2014). However, there is a huge subnational variation, with 
costs ranging as high as MXN90,000 per business unit in the aerospace hub 
of Querétaro (INEGI). According to the same agency, one-third of economic 
units (a category that includes both formal and informal goods and services 
providers of all sizes, including many micro-enterprises) reported being victims 
of crime in 2013. In this, too, there is a tremendous geographical variation, 
ranging from 21% in the state of San Luis Potosí to 44% in Baja California. 
Robbery, corruption, and extortion were the most common crimes against 
business. Combined, INEGI estimates that crime costs households and busi-
nesses about 2% of GDP each year.
Connectivity
Insufficient investment in various aspects of connectivity has limited North 
America’s ability to take advantage of its shared geography. This has been 
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most notable in inadequate physical infrastructure, which has been strained 
by the massive expansion of trade flows. New and expanded crossings are 
needed, but have stalled. A long-planned new bridge for the world’s most 
valuable border corridor, between Detroit and Windsor, is years behind 
schedule. Rail connections between the USA and Canada are outdated, even 
as they deal with tremendous quantities of freight. The planned Keystone 
XL pipeline has been shelved for the immediate future. Mexico’s rail system, 
after decades of neglect, has received increased attention, although a new 
rail crossing on the USA–Mexico border opened only after years of delays. 
In many cases, connectivity worsened after 2001 due to the “thickening” 
of US borders (Pastor 2011), lessening the region’s geographic advantages. 
This was exacerbated by policies that limited cross-border trucking between 
Mexico and the USA (in clear violation of the corresponding NAFTA pro-
visions), and created expensive cabotage restrictions to American-flagged 
vessels in the USA resulting from the Jones Act, a remnant of Prohibition. 
The 2014 North American Leaders Summit called for a North American 
Transportation Plan as a “key deliverable,” but this has not materialized. The 
2016 summit omitted mention of costly physical infrastructure and instead 
focused on deploying technology to make crossing more efficient—a wel-
come, but probably insufficient step. The lack of infrastructure is replicated 
in other areas. Among OECD members, Mexico has the second-lowest 
number of fixed broadband internet subscriptions per 100 residents. The 
USA is number 16 of 34 countries; Canada is number 12. All lag even further 
behind in faster fiber-optic connections. There have been a number of recent 
positive steps, like the binational airport crossing in Tijuana–San Diego; the 
agreement to allow customs officials to do pre-clearing in the other country’s 
territory; state-of-the-art customs-checking facilities going to Mexico; and 
trusted traveler programs and some improvements in screening procedures. 
However, for the most part these welcome developments barely compen-
sate for post-9/11 border thickening instead of advancing the region beyond 
where it was 15 years ago. A lot more needs to be done if North America 
retains its role of the most productive region on earth.
Governance and institutions
In governance and institutions, North America diverges clearly from the 
European model. Some of the thin institutions of NAFTA, such as the labor 
secretariat, have been allowed to expire. Less formal gatherings, such as the 
North American Leaders Summit, have been infrequent and subject to political 
whims. And given the political discourse prevalent in the presidential cam-
paigns of 2016, the chances of advancing a regional agenda appear dim.
From the perspective of RPGs, the crucial question for North America con-
cerns multilevel governance. How can the regional level better promote the 
creation of RPGs that penetrate to national and subnational levels? Up to this 
point, the approach has been the opposite: how to lessen the impact of failures 
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of governance and lack of rule of law at the subnational and national levels on 
regional transactions. The national and subnational weakness in rule of law pre-
sents a particular problem for North America, because regional institutions have 
few supranational capacities. Instead they rely heavily on national enforcement. 
However, NAFTA changed the landscape, creating new demands for coopera-
tion. “[I]ncentives for cooperation in providing RPGs are greater when there 
are economic incentives and commercial interests in place” (Estevadeordal, 
Frantz, and Nguyen 2004). Certainly, these incentives and interests exist in the 
case of North America, but for the most part, efforts to produce RPGs have 
been ad hoc. Where they have been institutionalized, they have been thin and 
have reached across various levels of governance. Creating institutions that fulfill 
this role without overly impinging on the sovereignty of the three countries that 
have traditionally guarded it zealously is a difficult task.
Conclusions
In conclusion, North America’s emergence as a region, and its production of 
RPGs, has been at once exemplary and incomplete. For the previous century, 
it has been a zone of interstate peace, but regional, transnational flows con-
tribute to high levels of violence. It was a leader in regional trade integration, 
but that integration did not produce widely shared prosperity. Opponents of 
deeper regionalism have often stressed a desire to avoid Europe’s bureaucratic 
model. However, they present a false choice: North America does not need 
larger bureaucracies to benefit from regionalism, but it does need greater polit-
ical and fiscal investment in the creation of RPGs to manage shared problems 
and to enhance the foundations of shared prosperity. The opportunities for 
even incremental improvements in cooperation are substantial, even as the 
very basis of regional cooperation faces its greatest political challenges since the 
ratification of NAFTA.
Notes
 1 For example, Deutsch (1957) discussed the USA and Canada as a security commu-
nity. During the Cold War, air-defense institution NORAD did not include Mexico, 
which was instead included in Latin American defense pacts.
 2 See the Regional Public Goods Database described by Liu and Kahn in Chapter 2 
of this volume.
 3 See footnote 2.
 4 The Mexican government undertook an unprecedented campaign throughout the 
USA, targeting the population of all congressional districts that had representatives 
that were undecided on the NAFTA issue, and encouraging them to write their 
member of congress in support of free trade with Mexico. The country spent US$50 
million on such lobbying between 1990 and 1993.
 5 Defined as including Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and the ten 
ASEAN nations.
 6 See footnote 2.
 7 On governance across levels of analysis, see Krahmann (2003).
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 8 Melissa Dell (2015) recently noted the variety of estimates of Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations’ earnings in the US market. The State Department’s own estimate ranges 
from US$13.6 to US$48.4 billion per year, with similar estimates from other US and 
Mexican government agencies. This stands in stark contrast to the estimated US$560 
million in domestic sales in Mexico.
 9 See Le Clercq Ortega, Antonio, and Rodríguez Sánchez Lara (2015) and “Judicial 
Systems,” Citizen Security Statistics for the Americas, database, Organization of 
American States. Online: www.oas.org/dsp/observatorio/database/indicatorsdetails.
aspx?lang=en&indicator=48
10 Data from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “SEVIS by the numbers,” 
October 2014. Online: www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2014/
by-the-numbers.pdf
11 This was a frequent complaint in Pastor’s many books and articles, such as The North 
American Idea (2011, p.191). See also Gueorguieva (2007).
12 See the “North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza,” April 2012. 
www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf
13 “Indice global de impunidad,” Centros de Estudios sobre Impunidad y Justicia. 
www.udlap.mx/cesij/resumenejecutivo.aspx
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